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I. INTRODUCTION
The year the Voting Rights Act was passed, Langston Hughes
published Long View: Negro. "Sighted through the [t]elescope of
dreams," Hughes wrote, Emancipation loomed very large:
But turn the telescope around,
Look through the larger end-
And wonder why
What was so large
Becomes so small
Again.1
* Professor of Law and Roy L. and Rosamond Woodruff Morgan Research Professor,
University of Virginia. Fifteen years ago, on the eve of the 1982 amendments to the Voting
Rights Act, Morgan Kousser began to ask what lessons we could learn from the end of the First
Reconstruction to preserve the Second. See J. Morgan Kousser, The Undermining of the First
Reconstruction: Lessons for the Second, in Chandler Davidson, ed., Minority Vote Dilution 27,
27-46 (Howard U., 1984). This Article reflects my effort to build upon Morgan's earlier work as
well as to think about some issues raised in a piece by Jim Blacksher, Dred Scott's Unwon
Freedom: The Redistricting Cases as Badges of Slavery, 39 Howard L. J. 633 (1996). I owe a
great deal to Jim and Morgan's intellectual and personal generosity in our many conversations
over the years. I also received many helpful suggestions from friends and colleagues at
Stanford, the University of Texas, the University of Virginia, and Vanderbilt; Tommy Goldstein,
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We don't really need to wonder why the political side of the First
Reconstruction failed; there were so many reasons. One was the
exhaustion of the national commitment to ensuring black equality and
its replacement by a cynical bipartisan compromise in which black
aspirations played no role. Another was the "progressive" belief that
ethnic politics was the enemy of good government. Yet a third was
the United States Supreme Court, which in a series of decisions from
United States v. Cruikshank2 through Giles v. Harris3 gutted African
Americans' ability to protect themselves through the political pro-
cess.
4
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is perhaps the cornerstone of the
Second Reconstruction. President Johnson rightly called it "one of the
most monumental laws in the entire history of American freedom."5
But it seems we are at a moment when the telescope is turning again;
when the expansive future is about to become a contracted present.
And the reasons for a potential Second Redemption bear a haunting
resemblance to the explanations offered for the First. Again, we have
an exhaustion of the national commitment to economic and racial
justice for blacks; again, "progressives" are suggesting that attention
to race has diverted us from more important issues; again, we have a
Supreme Court that is hostile to minority political empowerment.
When it comes to things in danger of becoming so small again,
the black presence in Congress looms high on the list. The past five
years have seen a sustained legal assault on newly created majority-
black congressional districts in the South, and there is a very real
possibility that for the first time since the end of the First
Reconstruction, black representation in southern congressional dele-
gations will decrease. 6 In previous work, I have explained why I reject
arguments that race-conscious districting involves discrimination
Sam Issacharoff, and Rick Pildes gave me particularly extensive comments; and Gary Gansle
provided superb research assistance.
1. Langston Hughes, Long View: Negro, in The Panther and the Lash 30 (Knopf, 1967).
2. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
3. 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
4. For a comprehensive account of the process, see J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of
Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880-
1910 (Yale U., 1974).
5. David J. Garrow, Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 at 132 (Yale U., 1978).
6. In this Article, I address only the situation of black Americans, in part because that is
where my expertise lies, in part because only they were the focus of both the First and the
Second Reconstructions, and in part because, as Sam Issacharoff points out in a marvelous
paper, the automatic translation of responses developed for black political exclusion to other
racial and ethnic minorities raises a host of problems not entirely germane to my argument
here. See Samuel Issacharoff, Groups and the Right to Vote, 44 Emory L. J. 869 (1995).
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against white voters.7 This Article addresses a different strand of the
argument against race-conscious districting: the claim that the crea-
tion of majority-black districts has perversely injured the very people
they were thought to help.8 This claim was first advanced as a gen-
eral criticism of vote dilution theory and it received greater currency
in the wake of the 1994 elections, in which the Democrats lost control
over the House of Representatives for the first time in forty years.
Part II of this Article sets out and assesses the theoretical and
empirical underpinnings of "bleaching" theory. The bleaching critique
of race-conscious districting rests on the identification of a potential
tension between two of the interlocking concerns embodied in the
right to vote: aggregation (the ability to elect the candidates of one's
choice) and governance (the ability to see one's policy preferences
enacted).9 Under some circumstances, increasing a voter's or group of
voters' ability to elect candidates directly may decrease the likelihood
that the legislature as a whole will be sympathetic to those voters'
point of view. In the context of the Voting Rights Act, this tension
plays out in the following fashion: concentrating black voters in a few
districts increases the likelihood that those voters will be able to elect
their most preferred candidates (usually candidates who are
themselves black), but leaves adjacent districts far whiter, and thus
far more conservative, than they would otherwise be. Ultimately,
race-conscious districting produces a legislature whose overall compo-
sition is less friendly to the interests of black voters.
I believe that the bleaching hypothesis vastly oversimplifies
the relationship between the Voting Rights Act and black influence
over the political process as a whole. It rests on a series of contradic-
tory premises about voting behavior both within the electorate and
inside the legislature. And it depends, in a way that its adherents do
not fully appreciate, on a set of assumptions about party behavior and
7. See Pamela S. Karlan and Daryl Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 Cal. L. Rev.
1201 (1996); Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw
Era, 26 Cumb. L. Rev. 287, 304-05 (1996); Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting Rights as
an American Nationalities Policy, 1995 U. Chi. Legal Forum 83, 95.
8. Rick Pildes has identified three "empirically oriented structures of belief and rhetoric
that justify political and public skepticism toward civil rights policies today," which he calls
"Accomplished Success, Abject Failure, and Perverse Effects." Richard H. Pildes, The Politics of
Race, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1359, 1359-60 (1995). The argument I consider here is a variant of
"Perverse Effects." As Pildes notes, "the perversity thesis is one of the recurring themes of
conservative political argument." Id. at 1359 n.6 (citing Albert 0. Hirschman, The Rhetoric of
Reaction " Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy 11-42 (Belknap, 1991)).
9. For a more complete discussion of this taxonomy, see Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to
Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1705, 1708-20 (1993).
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virtual representation. Nevertheless, as I discuss in the second Part
of this Article, there is a causal connection between black gains and
Democratic losses, but it operates on a deeper level than the technical
processes of reapportionment. Just as the black disenfranchisement
of the First Redemption was critical to creating the solid Democratic
South of the early- to mid-twentieth century, the black
enfranchisement of the Second Reconstruction was critical to
destroying that consensus. As black voters flocked to, and gained
increasing influence within, the Democratic Party, white voters left.
The main reason why the Democrats have lost the solid South is the
disappearance of their white, not their black, base.
While we have the telescope pointing backward, it's worth
looking off into the far distance. This is not the first time that some
commentators have decried the "unholy alliance" of blacks and
Republicans; or that some liberals have argued that the distinctive
political aspirations of blacks must be sacrificed to achieve progres-
sive politics; or that some politicians have played the race card to
divert white working people from issues of economic and social justice
by drawing their attention to racial fissures instead. When we con-
sider what democracy will be like in the next century-the topic of
this Symposium-we should ask what promises it held at the end of
the last, and how those promises came to be betrayed.
II. WHO'S RIGHT?: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE GENESIS OF THE
BLEACHING CRITIQUE
The bleaching critique begins with a simple mathematical fact:
given the requirements of one-person, one-vote, any districting plan
that increases an identifiable group's concentration in one set of dis-
tricts necessarily decreases its relative presence in the remaining
districts.10 This fact generates a set of competing possibilities. If
voting is polarized-that is, if members of the numerical minority
support candidates whom the remainder of the community op-
10. This axiom lies at the heart of partisan redistricting-the predominant concern of re-
apportionment in contemporary America. If the party controlling the districting process enjoyed
an overwhelming advantage among the electorate, it might simply spread its opponents across
the entire array of districts, in each of which they would constitute a powerless minority. But in
most jurisdictions, the party in control has a slim enough margin that such a technique would
be risky. Even in jurisdictions where it might be rational for the party to take the risk, individ-
ual incumbents want "safer" seats. So the party in control engages in a simultaneous process of
"packing" and "cracking": it concentrates as many of its opponents as possible into a few dis-
tricts in which it concedes victory, and then spreads the remaining opposition across the dis-
tricts it has arrogated to itself.
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poses-concentrating that minority into a few districts can increase
its ability to elect candidates it prefers by creating some districts in
which it becomes a majority." As long as voting is truly polarized,
this is the only way that the minority will be able to elect the candi-
dates it prefers, since by definition in a polarized community the
majority refuses to support candidates who represent the minority's
viewpoint.
By contrast, if the fault lines in the jurisdiction's politics sepa-
rate voters along some unrelated dimension, placing a minority
group's members in only a few districts can decrease the number of
representatives they elect.12 Of particular importance, concentrating
the group's members into only those districts in which they predomi-
nate can strip the group of its status as a pivotal bloc, able to "swing"
elections in a number of districts to the candidates (sponsored primar-
ily by another, larger group) who offer the most in return. A group's
ability to operate as a swing bloc depends for the most part on two
factors: its size relative to the size of the gap between the competing
factions and, as I have already emphasized, its location away from the
fissures that divide the rest of the electorate. If the remainder of the
electorate is in equipoise, even a very small bloc may be able to ex-
tract substantial concessions in return for its support. That has been
the position of the ultra-Orthodox parties in Israel. By contrast,
although Israeli Arabs could also form the final piece of a winning
coalition, they enjoy far less political power than the ultra-Orthodox,
even though they are a much larger voting bloc, because the major
blocs believe that to compete vigorously for Israeli-Arab support risks
alienating more votes from existing supporters than it would attract. 3
Already we have moved a long way from simple mathematical
fact. As Justice Harlan warned us long ago, "people are not ciphers,"14
and not all numerically identical blocs are equal in their ability to
11. Any members of the group left outside the district will still be unable to elect candi-
dates directly, but they will now enjoy virtual representation from the officials elected by their
compatriots in group-controlled districts.
12. 'Elect" in this sense includes those candidates who receive the group's support, even if
they are not themselves members of the group.
13. See, for example, The Israeli Election; Israel's Minority Ethnic Groups Could Hold
Sway in Election; Arabs, New Immigrants Make Up Key Bloc of Voters, Minn. Star Trib. 6A
(May 27, 1996) (explaining that despite the swing potential of an Arab voting bloc in the Israeli
presidential election, it "would still be politically unpalatable for the prime minister to invite an
Arab party to become part of a coalition government"); Deborah Horan, Israel-Elections: Arab
Vote Key to Upcoming Elections, Inter Press Service (May 9, 1996) (describing a Likud short film
designed to foster fear of Arab control over the Israeli elections).
14. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 623 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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become members of winning electoral or governing coalitions. Thus,
there is an important ambiguity in the Justice's later observation that
he was not clear "how a court would go about deciding whether an at-
large system is to be preferred over a district system [because u]nder
one system, Negroes have some influence in the election of all officers;
under the other, minority groups have more influence in the selection
of fewer officers."'15 Either Justice Harlan was advancing a very for-
mal notion of influence-that mere presence within the electorate
means that a group influences representatives regardless of whether
the candidate it supports ever wins' 6-- or he was assuming that black
voters will often be part of the winning coalition and (and here the
unstated assumption is quite critical), having voted for the winner,
will enjoy some tangible influence over the policies she espouses.
The same tensions are recapitulated when we step back from
asking questions about aggregation-such as whether the candidates
for whom the group votes win the election-to consider issues of
governance: how responsive is the legislative process to the group's
distinctive needs? On the one hand, representatives from minority-
dominated districts will (presumably) vigorously advance the group's
interests.7 On the other hand, representatives from the remaining
districts have no direct incentives to be responsive to the group's
interests, since their political survival does not depend on pleasing
the minority. Thus, the success of the group's legislative agenda will
depend largely on the ability of its representatives to horse trade and
logroll. To the extent that representatives from minority-dominated
districts can form winning coalitions within the legislature, they can
further the group's interests; to the extent that they are shut out of
majority coalitions, they cannot. Put another way, the same sort of
"swing" dynamic so critical to understanding a group's ability to elect
its candidates plays a major role in its ability to see its legislative
preferences satisfied.
15. Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 586 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
16. This notion is somewhat akin to the notion of influence over the political process as a
whole embraced in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), where even Democrats in an
overwhelmingly Republican district were seen as enjoying influence despite the fact that they
never voted for the winning candidate. See Karlan and Levinson, 84 Cal. L. Rev. at 1209 (cited
in note 7).
17. The minority group presumably will have more influence over officials when it makes
up their entire electoral base than over officials who have to juggle responding to the group's
interests with responding to the interests of other essential constituencies.
296 [Vol. 50:291
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A. The Bleaching Critique and Direct Representation
The bleaching critics offer a set of essentially categorical an-
swers to questions about the aggregation/governance tradeoff. Their
central claim is that creating majority-black districts comes at (too
high) a price. Such districts concededly increase the likelihood that
black voters will be able to elect the candidates of their choice. This is
particularly true if those candidates are black, as they tend to be,
since virtually no black representatives from the South are elected
except from majority-black districts. 8 Thus, to the extent that voting
power is measured simply in terms of controlling the outcome of par-
ticular elections, these districts benefit black voters: in majority-
black districts, black voters can elect the candidates they prefer re-
gardless of the white community's preferences.
But to the extent that voting power is measured in terms of the
ability to enact favorable legislation, these critics think blacks are
worse off. Their representatives find themselves isolated within a
majority-white legislature whose white representatives now have
little incentive to respond to blacks' needs, since their districts are
18. See Lisa Handley and Bernard Grofman, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on
Miywrity Representation: Black Officeholding in Southern State Legislatures and Congressional
Delegations, in Chandler Davidson and Bernard Grofman, eds., Quiet Revolution in the South:
The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-1990 at 335, 337, 343 (Princeton U., 1994) (observing
that all of the black House members from the South were elected from majority-black districts
and fewer than 2% of black state legislators in the South were elected from majority-white
jurisdictions). See also Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the
Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1077, 1112-13 & nn. 165-68 (1991) (collecting
cases, surveys, and scholarly studies that show a widespread refusal of white voters to vote for
black candidates).
In the 1996 congressional elections, five incumbent black Representatives who had origi-
nally won election from majority-black districts retained their seats despite having had their
districts reconfigured in the wake of wrongful districting challenges. Kevin Sack, Victory of 5
Redistricted Blacks Recasts Gerrymandering Dispute, N.Y. Times 1 (Nov. 23, 1996). While these
victories are clearly a cause for optimism, since they suggest that incumbent black politicians
can appeal to at least some white voters, they hardly suggest that racial bloc voting has ended.
See id. (noting that only 31% of white voters in the reconfigured Georgia Eleventh District voted
for black incumbent Cynthia McKinney and only 36% of white voters in the reconfigured
Georgia Second District voted for black incumbent Sanford Bishop). Moreover, in two of the
districts, black voters still represented a plurality of the electorate. See id. (describing Texas's
new Eighteenth District as 44% black and 21% Hispanic; its Thirtieth District as 42% black and
16% Hispanic). And the haste with which the plans were redrawn may even have increased the
normal advantage incumbents enjoy. See also Charles S. Bullock, Incumbency, Not Race, Wins
in the South, Newsday A41 (Nov. 13, 1996) (raising the question whether black candidates
would be able to compete successfully for open seats). As the Fifth Circuit once remarked in
responding to the claim that a school district that had been desegregated for only one semester
had achieved unitary status, "[o]ne swallow does not make a spring." Lemon v. Bossier Parish
School Bd., 444 F-2d 1400, 1401 (5th Cir. 1971).
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safely white. Blacks have sacrificed influence over a broad array of
legislators for control over only a few, and those few are too few to
command legislative power. Put in somewhat more formal terms, the
critique assumes that although "citizens choose among candidates
that then constitute assemblies rather than choose among the
[potential] assemblies directly... the voter's preferences over assem-
blies, not candidates, are fundamental."19
Abigail Thernstrom's work epitomizes the standard version of
the bleaching critique.2 Thernstrom begins from the premise that
non-racial political cleavages eclipse racial cleavages within southern
politics. Thus, black voters occupy a potentially pivotal position
within the electorate: "[W]hite solidarity in the face of black enfran-
chisement is seldom permanent; blacks become a powerful swing vote
when white candidates begin to compete."21 Race-conscious district-
ing, however, deprives blacks of their role as swing voters, and frees
politicians in the majority of districts, which are now overwhelmingly
white, of the pressure to respond to blacks' concerns:
Amending section 2 [of the Voting Rights Act] ... was neither in the public
interest nor in the more narrowly defined interest of minorities. [Professor
Donald] Horowitz contended that "assured minority representation encourages
local white politicians to say to the minority communities: You have your own
representatives. Don't come to us with your problems; speak to them." And,
"at best, under such circumstances, it can be said that separate representation
postpones interethnic and interracial political contact and bargaining until
after the election results are in, when polarization may already have occurred
and when a minority on a local council may be powerless." In the end,
19. Jean-Pierre Benoit and Lewis Kornhauser, Voting Simply in the Election of Assemblies
27 (1991) (Starr Center for Applied Economics Working Paper No. 91-32) (on file with the
Author).
20. Abigail M. Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count?: Affirmative Action and Minority Voting
Rights (Harvard U., 1987). An updated and abridged version of her critique appears in Abigail
Thernstrom, More Notes from a Political Thicket, 44 Emory L. J. 911 (1995). In this piece, I
address solely Thernstrom's articulation of the bleaching hypothesis. For my response to other
parts of her argument, see Pamela S. Karlan and Peyton McCrary, Book Review, Without Fear
and Without Research: Abigail Thernstrom on the Voting Rights Act, 4 J. L. & Pol. 751 (1988).
21. Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count? at 23 (cited in note 20). See Holder v. Hall, 114 S.
Ct. 2581, 2596, 129 L. Ed. 2d 687 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) ("[E]specially in a
two-party system such as ours, the influence of a potential 'swing group' of voters composing
10%-20% of the electorate in a given district can be considerable."); Rural West Tennessee
African-American Affairs Council v. McWherter, 877 F. Supp. 1096, 1101 (W.D. Tenn. 1995)
(three-judge court) (holding, as a matter of law, that blacks are an influential swing vote when
they constitute between 25% and 55% of the voting age population) summarily affd, 116 S. Ct.
42 (1995).
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minority influence may thus be reduced. The amendment was "very
good.., for prospective black officeholders but not for their constituents."2 2
Thernstrom claims not simply that blacks will elect more representa-
tives if they are "plac[ed] ... in largely white constituencies"23 in the
sense that more incumbents will owe their victory to black sup-
port-but that blacks will enjoy more overall influence on the legisla-
tive process. 24 Although the ranks of the bleaching critique are
largely filled by neoliberals and neoconservatives, even some
unabashedly liberal intellectuals have articulated a similar concern.25
22. Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count? at 124-25 (cited in note 20) (citations omitted).
Thernstrom continues:
Where the line is drawn between the excessive concentration and the undue dispersal of
minority voters within and between districts ultimately depends on the weight given to
minority officeholding. To the civil rights groups in New York [who were arguing that
the state legislative redistricting plan should include more districts with effective non-
white voting majorities], the risk of "wasting" minority votes by creating districts with a
65 or 75 percent minority concentration appeared more acceptable than losing seats.
The city began with a different premise-that the number of black officeholders could
rise, and yet real black power decrease. From this perspective, black interests are
served to the degree that black or white elected officials who are responsive to the black
community hold office. To assume that concentrating the black and Hispanic population
necessarily benefits those voters, an attorney for the city suggested, "fails to recognize
that minority access to the political process can also be enhanced by placing minority
voters in largely white constituencies. That way, the minorities will have a political
foothold in more than one district. Otherwise, the pure white districts are free to ignore
the interests of minorities with impunity."
Id. at 187-88.
23. Id. at 188 (quoting, with evident approval, a memorandum by Edward Costikyan
arguing in favor of a New York City councilmanic redistricting plan).
24. In her concurrence in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), Justice O'Connor
offered a similar perspective. She rejected the idea that "the voting strength of a racial group
[should] be assessed solely with reference to its prospects for electoral success." Id. at 87-88.
Instead, courts should "bear in mind that 'the power to influence the political process is not
limited to winning elections."' Id. at 99 (quoting Davis, 478 U.S. at 132). That Justice
O'Connor nonetheless agreed with Justice Brennan as to the proper result in each of the
challenged districts relieved her of the need to explain the precise contours of her theory. And
as she later recognized in her unanimous opinion for the Court in Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S.
146 (1993), the question could not be answered in the abstract in any event:
Mhe creation of majority-minority districts does not invariably minimize or maximize
minority voting strength. Instead, it can have either effect or neither. On the one hand,
creating majority-black districts necessarily leaves fewer black voters and therefore di-
minishes black-voter influence in predominantly white districts. On the other hand, the
creation of majority-black districts can enhance the influence of black voters.... Which
effect the practice has, if any at all, depends entirely on the facts and circumstances of
each case.
Id. at 154-55. In the period between Gingles and Shaw, however, the ability to elect directly
served as the dominant measure of voting strength.
25. See, for example, Hendrik Hertzberg and Henry Louis Gates, Jr., The African-
American Century, New Yorker 9-10 (Apr. 29 & May 6, 1996) CIn the House of
Representatives... black progress has come at the price of racial gerrymandering. It's a high
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There is an unexamined tension at the core of this argument.
At one level, for bleaching to be a realistic possibility, Thernstrom and
her allies must accept that the black community has a set of distinc-
tive electoral preferences that most white voters do not share.26 If
black and white voters had identical preferences, no one would have
an incentive to engage in race-conscious districting, since the same
candidates would win, and the same laws would be enacted, regard-
less of the racial composition of the electorate. Thus, the candidates
whom black voters would elect if they controlled the political process
outright differ from the candidates white voters would choose if they
alone were in charge. As a doctrinal matter, proof that black and
white voters prefer different candidates is a necessary precondition to
any requirement that majority-black districts be drawn.27 At another
level, however, proponents of the bleaching hypothesis maintain that
politics is not so racially riven that the number of white voters driven
away by a candidate's pursuit of black support exceeds the number of
black voters she can attract. This places them in an ambiguous rela-
tionship to the central concept of vote dilution law: racial bloc vot-
ing.28 They must both assume and downplay its existence.
A similar tension underlies the bleaching critics' account of
behavior within the legislature. Their central assumption is that
black voters would be better off having some influence over a broad
range of legislators rather than intense influence over a few. Both
experience and public-choice theory suggest, however, that insular,
well-organized constituencies often enjoy disproportionate influence
relative to diffuse groups. Moreover, the fact that groups that have
influence within the reapportionment process usually choose to draw
price: it drains (liberal) black voting strength from neighboring districts, often tipping them
over into the control of politicians indifferent to black interests .. "); Sean Wilentz, The Last
Integrationist, New Republic 19 (July 1, 1996) (stating that Representative John Lewis also
worries that majority-black districts may segregate black voters).
26. For a summary of evidence supporting the existence of divergent black and white
policy preferences, see Pildes, 108 Harv L. Rev. at 1378 n.84 (cited in note 8).
27. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48-50 (requiring minority voters to "prove that the use of a
multimember electoral structure operates to minimize or cancel out their ability to elect their
preferred candidates").
28. Racial bloc voting (or racially polarized voting) refers to situations in which members
of different racial groups prefer different candidates. There is an ongoing debate in the case law
and in the courts over whether racial bloc voting refers simply to a correlation between race and
a voter's preference-that is, that white and black voters support different candidates for
whatever reason-or instead requires some proof of causation-that is, that white and black
voters prefer different candidates for reasons connected to race. For a discussion of this issue,
see Karlan and Levinson, 84 Cal. L. Rev. at 1220-25 (cited in note 7). See generally Samuel
Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of Voting Rights
Jurisprudence, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1833 (1992) (describing the centrality of racial bloc voting to
modern voting rights law).
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districts in which they predominate, rather than spreading them-
selves across a greater number of districts, cautions against blind
acceptance of the critics' assumption.
Thus, the burden on the bleaching critic is to explain why
blacks, as opposed to other groups with discrete policy preferences,
should reject the strategy of interest-group logrolling within the legis-
lature in favor of diffuse influence within the polity. The critics need
to explain why representatives from white districts will be distinc-
tively reluctant to trade with black representatives. Otherwise, rep-
resentatives from black communities would presumably be able to
build winning coalitions the same way representatives from other
groups can. A fair amount of governmental largesse is garnered by
groups-for example, workers associated with particular indus-
tries-who start out with far fewer congressmen in their camp than
belong to the Congressional Black Caucus.
Two explanations for white representatives' reluctance to trade
leap to mind. Perhaps they are so personally bigoted that they refuse
to bargain with black representatives even when it is in their con-
stituents' interest. That seems unlikely, certainly as a systematic
explanation. A more plausible assumption is that white representa-
tives believe that the voters in their districts will penalize them for
voting in favor of black interests, in contrast, for example, to the fact
that voters in an overwhelmingly urban district will not retaliate
against their representative when she votes in favor of subsidies for
rural disaster relief in a faraway state. White "backlash" could have
several causes: white voters might have a mean-spirited taste for
frustrating black aspirations; they might rightly conclude that
satisfying some particular demand of the black community is a zero-
sum game; or they might simply misunderstand the consequences of
particular policies. Whatever the cause of this white backlash, its
effect on a white representative is similar: the cost to her (in terms of
her own career prospects) of offering to trade votes with black
representatives is higher than the cost of joining coalitions with
representatives who do not ask her to back an identifiably black
agenda as the price of their support. Thus, although at the electoral
level, proponents of bleaching embrace a strong presumption in favor
of seeing blacks as a swing vote, they have to assume that blacks are
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precluded from being swing votes within the legislature. For reasons
I have explored elsewhere, this assumption seems implausible.29
B. Bleaching and Virtual Representation
The most recent expression of bleaching theory arose in the
wake of the 1994 elections. It offers an important refinement relating
to partisan politics.30 For the first time in forty years, the Democratic
Party lost control over the House. The party lost the Senate and a
slew of governorships and state legislatures as well. In a "who lost
China?" mood, commentators fastened on the Voting Rights Act as a
prime culprit. They argued that by overconcentrating black voters in
a few, "safe," majority-black districts, the post-1990 reapportionment
left white Democratic incumbents vulnerable.3' The estimates of the
number of seats lost due to this reapportionment vary from a handful
to roughly twenty.32 Many of the observers claim that race-conscious
29. Representatives from the black community may enjoy a fair degree of influence within
the legislature because of their abilities to logroll and to enforce previously agreed-upon deals.
Representatives are more likely than their constituents to enjoy these abilities because voting
within legislatures is neither anonymous nor "bundled." Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and
Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 173, 216-19 (1989).
30. The absence of attention to partisan consequences in the early bleaching critiques is
explicable perhaps as a function of their concentration on the effects of moving from at-large to
ward-based elections for local and county governments. That certainly was the context for most
of the arguments raised at the time of the 1982 amendments. First, most of those elections
were nonpartisan. See 1982 Municipal Year Book 181 (International City Management
Association) (finding that 70.2% of municipal elections are nonpartisan). Second, even when the
elections were not formally nonpartisan, in most of the relevant jurisdictions the Democratic
Party was so dominant at the local level that no election system was likely to produce
distinctive partisan effects.
31. See, for example, Mark F. Bernstein, Racial Gerrymandering, Pub. Int. 59 (Winter
1996); Kevin A. Hill, Does the Creation of Majority Black Districts Aid Republicans?: An
Analysis of the 1992 Congressional Elections in Eight Southern States, 57 J. Pol. 384 (1995);
David Ian Lublin, Racial Redistricting and the New Republican Majority: A Critique of the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund Report on the 1994 Congressional Elections (1995) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Author); John J. Miller, Race to Defeat: How the Black Caucus
Elected Newt Gingrich Speaker, Reason 23 (Feb. 1995); Carol M. Swain, Limiting Racial
Gerrymandering: The Future of Black Representation, Current 3 (Jan. 1996).
Petrocik and Desposato offer a more complex account. They argue that the creation of
majority-black districts in itself had only a marginal direct effect. John R. Petrocik and Scott W.
Desposato, The Partisan Consequences of Majority-Minority Redistricting in the South, 1992 and
1994 at 14-15 (Feb. 1996). Rather, the second-order effects that came from reshuffling majority-
white Democratic districts in order to comply with one-person, one-vote once black voters had
been relocated to newly created districts deprived many Democratic representatives of the
traditional incumbency bonus. This, combined with an anti-Democratic tide, led to incumbents'
defeats. See id. at 16-24. As I shall discuss below, Petrocik and Desposato's focus on the disap-
pearance of white Democrats is a key element of the overall picture.
32. See, for example, Charles Bullock, Affirmative Action Districts: In Whose Faces Will
They Blow Up?, Campaigns & Elections 22 (Apr. 1995) (noting that the GOP gained sixteen
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districting was a major cause of the Republican takeover. 33 Moreover,
the commentators say that not only has this been bad for white
Democrats, but that it has been bad for black voters as well, since the
incoming white Republican legislators are far less friendly to black
interests.34 While some proponents of this theory see the situation as
an unintended consequence of the pressure for majority-black
districts, others have taken a more conspiratorial tack, viewing the
electoral results as the product of an alliance between Republicans
and blacks.35
southern seats in 1994 in addition to a net pick-up of nine seats in 1992 and that "[a]mong the
causes is affirmative action gerrymandering"); Hill, 57 J. Pol. at 391 (cited in note 31)
(estimating that four of seven southern seats that changed hands in 1992 were attributable to
the creation of majority-black districts, and predicting a far greater loss in 1994); Lublin, Racial
Redistricting at 26 table 1 (cited in note 31) (identifying seven districts lost in 1992 as a result of
racial redistricting and six additional districts lost in 1994); Miller, Reason at 23 (cited in note
31) (quoting David Bositis, a senior researcher at the Joint Center for Political and Economic
Studies, asserting that "[o]ver the last two elections, the Democrats have lost as many as 15
seats because of majority black redistricting"); Jeffrey Rosen, Southern Comfort, New Republic 4
(Jan. 8 & 15, 1996) C'Carol Swain of Princeton University conservatively estimates that the
creation of fifteen black and eleven Hispanic districts after the 1990 Census cost the Democrats
a total of seventeen seats in the last two elections.").
At the other end of the spectrum, a report prepared by the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund claims the Democrats would have lost even more House seats without the
creation of additional minority-dominated districts. See NAACP Legal Defense & Educational
Fund, The Effect of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act on the 1994 Congressional Elections 2
(Nov. 30, 1994).
33. See, for example, Lublin, Racial Redistricting at 19-20 (cited in note 31); Miller,
Reason at 23 (cited in note 31); Swain, Current at 4 (cited in note 31).
34. As Bernstein notes:
Black participation in Congress may be at an all-time high, but are black interests bet-
ter represented this year under Republican control than they were last year? Loss of the
House cost the Congressional Black Caucus three full committee and 17 subcommittee
chairmanships. As David A. Bositis of the Joint Center for Political and Economic
Studies notes, blacks feel the loss of House control more severely than do whites because
black political fortunes are inseparable from those of the Democratic party. True, the
Black Caucus does now exercise proportionately more influence within the Democratic
caucus, but gaining a larger share of a shrinking pie is not a formula for success.
Bernstein, Pub. Int. at 59 (cited in note 31). See also Swain, Current at 4 (cited in note 31)
("African Americans lost substantive representation in 1994: The new Republican Congress
represents their interests less than the previous Democratic one even though the new Congress
has more black members.").
35. For representative descriptions of the "unholy alliance" theory, see, for example,
Thomas Byrne Edsall and Mary D. Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and
Taxes on American Politics 269-71 (W.W. Norton & Co., 1991); Kimball Brace, Bernard
Grofman, and Lisa Handley, Does Redistricting Aimed to Help Blacks Necessarily Help
Republicans?, 49 J. Pol. 169, 182 n.15 (1987); Michael Oreskes, Political Memo; Seeking Seats,
Republicans Find Ally in Rights Act, N.Y. Times All (Aug. 20, 1990); A. Lee Parks, Georgia's
Unholy Alliance, N.Y. Times A21 (Aug. 25, 1995); Jim Sleeper, The Newest Hurdle for
Minorities; Racial Gerrymandering Will Hurt, Not Help, Blacks and Hispanics, Newsday 55
(Aug. 28, 1992); Rosen, New Republic at 4 (cited in note 32); Swain, Current at 5 (cited in note
31); Paul Taylor, GOP Will Aid Civil Rights Groups in Redistricting; Party Sees Additional
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I don't want to get bogged down in the methodologies and val-
idity of the various studies, each of which, as far as I can tell, is al-
most entirely a prisoner of its assumptions. Rather, I want to high-
light two features of the political landscape that generally have either
been missed or dismissed.
The first is that the Democratic share of the white vote in the
South has been dropping for the past thirty years. 36 The decline first
appeared in national elections-the 1964 Johnson/Goldwater race was
the watershed here-but by the 1990s it had reached congressional
and statewide contests as well. A majority of the U.S. Senators from
the South are Republican (thirteen of twenty-two), as are a majority
of the governors (six of eleven). The Republican Party won five of six
southern senatorial seats up for election in 1994, as well as four of
seven southern gubernatorial races.3 7  Neither senatorial nor
gubernatorial elections are subject to redistricting. Thus, something
beyond districting is clearly at work in producing Republican gains.38
For a time, the strength of the southern turn toward the
Republican Party was masked by several factors. Democrats already
occupying elective office enjoyed an incumbency bonus. 39 Some voters
continued to vote for their current Democratic representative even
after they had otherwise abandoned the Democratic Party. But when
that representative retired or, as a result of redistricting, was relo-
Minority Legislative Seats Boosting Republican Fortunes Elsewhere, Wash. Post A6 (Apr. 1,
1990). For a critical rejoinder to the argument, see Laughlin McDonald, The Counterrevolution
in Minority Voting Rights, 65 Miss. L. J. 271, 291-94 (1995) ("Republican efforts were no more
sinister, nor less constitutionally protected, than similar efforts by Democrats... to advance
their partisan interests.").
36. For a comprehensive study of party realignment, see Edward G. Carmines and James
A. Stimson, Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics (Princeton U.,
1989). In House elections from 1980 to 1994, on average 87% of black voters, but only 49% of
white voters, voted Democratic. And this racial gap has increased over time. From 1990 to
1994, the Democratic Party's share of the southern white vote decreased from 50% to 35%, while
its share of the southern black vote increased from 80% to 91%. See Portrait of the Electorate.
Who Voted for Whom in the House, N.Y. Times 24 (Nov. 13, 1994).
37. See Appendix 1. "Southern" states refers to Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
38. See McDonald, 65 Miss. L. J. at 295 (cited in note 35) (stating that "since the Senate is
elected statewide rather than from districts, congressional redistricting could not have logically
been the cause of the Democratic losses"). Leaving the South for a moment, it is worth noting
that in 1994, the Democrats lost seven non-southern governorships, six non-southern senatorial
seats, and control over six non-southern state senates and seven non-southern state houses.
See Election Data Services, 1994 Election Results Map (1994). Moreover, of the fifty-four U.S.
House seats the Democrats lost in 1994, twenty-four were in states without majority-black
districts. See NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Effect of Section 2 at 5 (cited in note
32).
39. One estimate is that incumbency is currently worth 8.4 percentage points for a
Democrat. Lublin, Racial Redistricting at 5 (cited in note 31).
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cated to a different district,40 the voters' Republican colors emerged.
In addition, as black voters surged into the voting booth, their
increasing numbers compensated for decreasing white support.
Finally, because Democrats controlled the post-1990 redistricting
process, 41 they were able to spread their remaining votes very
efficiently through partisan gerrymandering. But there is an inherent
tradeoff between efficiency and risk in such gerrymandering: the
closer the party in power shaves its margin of victory, the more seats
it can acquire, but the more likely it becomes that a small shift in the
electorate will produce a huge swing in seats.42 The 1990 Democratic
gerrymanders were, with respect to white Democratic incumbents,
tremendously efficient, given the existing partisan distribution of
white votes. But "[t]he slow bleeding of whites from the Democratic
party reached hemorrhage proportions in 1994" when sixty-five
percent of white southern voters supported Republican candidates. 43
Thus, seats that would have remained Democratic if Democratic
allegiance and turnout had remained at their 1990 levels turned
Republican because some Democratic voters switched parties and
others simply stayed home." Perhaps a more prudent Democratic
Party would have sacrificed a few of its seats following 1990 in order
to shore up its margins in the remainder, but that would have
required throwing some incumbent Democratic representatives
overboard. Unlike shipwrecked mariners of previous centuries who
apparently always ate the cabin boy, however, incumbents have yet to
develop a convention for deciding whose district to carve up. Even so,
Democrats retained some of their partisan advantage: in seven of the
eleven Deep South states the vote/seat ratio was still in their favor.45
40. This is the core of Petrocik and Desposato's thesis. See Petrocik and Desposato,
Partisan Consequences at 16-20 (cited in note 31).
41. See Appendix 1. See also Pildes, 108 Harv. L. Rev. at 1389-90 (cited in note 8)
(discussing partisan aspects of the 1990s reapportionment process).
42. This would be true even if an anti-incumbent shift occurs in every district, since a key
gerrymandering technique is to "pack" one's opponents into a few districts in which one con-
cedes victory.
43. McDonald, 65 Miss. L. J. at 298 (cited in note 35).
44. This latter factor is worth emphasizing. Nationwide, "only 17 of the 56 Republicans
who won seats [in 1994] formerly held by Democrats had higher vote totals than losing
Republicans had won in those districts in 1992." Center for Voting and Democracy, Dubious
Democracy: 1994 Elections: U.S. House of Representatives 2 (1995). In the eleven southern
states, eight of the fourteen Republicans who captured previously Democratic seats actually
received fewer votes than losing Republicans had received two years before. See id.
45. Even in Georgia and North Carolina, the two states which proponents of bleaching
most often cite, had the Democrats won five seats instead of four, their share of the seats would
be proportional to their share of the votes. See Appendix 1.
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The results of the 1996 House elections in three key states
demonstrate this general point. The Supreme Court had struck down
four majority-black congressional districts in North Carolina, Texas,
and Georgia on the grounds that race had played an unjustifiably
pivotal role in their creation.46 District courts in the latter two states
ordered new apportionment plans into effect for the 1996 elections. In
Georgia, the plan dramatically reduced the percentage of black voters
within the districts represented by black incumbents. 47  Yet the
spreading of black voters over many more districts apparently had no
effect on the outcome.48 Every Georgia district reelected the incum-
bent Representative; 49 all three Democratic Representatives are black,
while all eight whites are Republican. By contrast, the Democrats
picked up a seat in North Carolina and managed to retain an open
seat.50 Perhaps the 1996 elections do offer one auspicious signal:
black incumbents can attract enough white support to retain their
seats, presumably in part because their legislative track records and
constituent services win over some skeptical white voters. In this
sense, the affirmative-action dimension of race-conscious districting
worked wonderfully: it enabled black candidates for the "job" of
Representative who otherwise would never have been selected to
46. Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 135 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1996) (North Carolina); Bush v.
Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 135 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1996) (Texas); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 132
L. Ed. 2d 762 (1995) (Georgia). For extensive discussions of the contours of these "wrongful
districting" cases, see, for example, T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Samuel Issacharoff, Race and
Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 588 (1993);
Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 S. Ct.
Rev. 245; Karlan, 26 Cumb. L. Rev. at 287 (cited in note 7); Richard H. Pildes and Richard T.
Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District
Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 483 (1993).
47. See Johnson v. Miller, 922 F. Supp. 1556 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (completely revamping
Georgia's congressional apportionment in light of its earlier holding that Georgia House District
2, as well as District 11-the subject of the earlier Miller litigation-involved an
unconstitutional use of race), prob. juris. noted as Abrams v. Johnson, 116 S. Ct. 1823 (May 20,
1996) (Nos. 95-1425 and 95-1460). Miller reduced the black voting-age populations in the two
Georgia districts drastically, from 52% and 60%, respectively, to 35% and 33%. Miller, 922 F.
Supp. at 1571-72; Sack, N.Y. Times at 1 (cited in note 18). See also Vera v. Bush, 933 F. Supp.
1341 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (redrawing, among others, Texas House Districts 18 and 30). Vera
reduced the black voting-age populations in the two Texas districts from 49% and 47%,
respectively, to 44% and 42%. Nonetheless, these districts were still plurality black, and
majority nonwhite, due to substantial concentrations of Hispanic voters. Sack, N.Y. Times at 1
(cited in note 18). In North Carolina, the district court declined to order a new plan for the 1996
elections, so those elections took place under the pre-existing plan declared unconstitutional in
Shaw v. Hunt. See In re Shaw, 65 U.S.L.W. 3162 (Aug. 27, 1996) (summarizing the litigation on
remand from the Supreme Court).
48. Under the courts plan, blacks constituted more than a quarter of the population in
five of the ten newly majority-white districts. Miller, 922 F. Supp. at 1571-72.
49. The 105th Congress of the United States, Boston Globe A24 (Nov. 10, 1996).
50. The 1996 Elections: The States; South, N.Y. Times B9 (Nov. 7, 1996).
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demonstrate their qualifications and overcome white stereotypes that
viewed them as unqualified.
A second critical feature of the political landscape involves the
mechanism by which black southerners in majority-white districts
have their policy preferences actually "represented." Leaving aside
direct constituent services-which I do not mean to slight, but which
are largely performed, at least today, without regard for the race of
the constituent51-the major benefit southern blacks receive from
being in white Democratic, as opposed to white Republican, districts
often comes from a sort of virtual, rather than direct, representation.
One especially powerful reason for southern black voters to support
the Democratic candidate is not really because he personally will be a
staunch advocate for their policy preferences,5 2 but because when
51. When observers remark on how Strom Thurmond has become responsive to his black
constituents, see, for example, Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count? at 109 (cited in note 20), this
has to be the level to which they are referring. Senator Thurmond is well noted in Washington
for having one of the most diligent senatorial staffs with respect to constituent services. That
these services are divorced from substantive policy positions seems clear, since no one contends
that Senator Thurmond supports the Democratic legislative agenda that every congressman
elected from a majority-black district supports.
52. The most powerful illustration of this point was made by Morgan Kousser. He
graphed the Congressional Quarterly Conservative Coalition scores of North Carolina's repre-
sentatives for the period from 1970 to 1993. Until 1992, there was no systematic difference
between the votes of the two congressmen from the most heavily black districts-districts that
were nonetheless majority white-and the votes of the representatives from districts with
substantially lower black populations. A few times, the two representatives from the "blackest"
districts were more conservative than even the Republicans. By contrast, there was an im-
mense gap between the two representatives' voting behavior and the voting behavior of black
southern Democratic representatives. The North Carolinians' scores were, with one exception,
always above sixty; the black Democrats' scores were always at or below twenty.
After 1992, the CQ scores for the two representatives serving the two most heavily black
districts in North Carolina dropped from roughly sixty to roughly ten, putting them essentially
in line with representatives from predominantly-black districts. The difference? The post-1990
reapportionment created two majority-black districts which elected black representatives. See
Conference, The Supreme Court, Racial Politics, and the Right to Vote: Shaw v. Reno and the
Future of the Voting Rights Act, 44 Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 60-62 (1994) (comments of Morgan
Kousser). See also A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Gregory A. Clarick, and Marcella David, Shaw v.
Reno: A Mirage of Good Intentions With Devastating Racial Consequences, 62 Fordham L. Rev.
1593, 1653-57 (1994) (reprinting tables showing the voting records of white and black southern
Democratic representatives in the 103d Congress, 1st Session, that show huge disparities
between the two groups).
Appendix 2 to this Article replicates Kousser's research with regard to southern Democratic
representatives more generally. It contains a scattergram plotting the Conservative Coalition
scores for all southern Democratic representatives against the percentage of each district's
voting-age population that is nonwhite. The data reveal that increasing the black percentage of
a white Democratic representative's district had virtually no effect on his voting behavior and
that there was a dramatic difference between the voting behavior of representatives elected by
majority-nonwhite constituencies and those elected from majority-white districts.
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there is a partisan divide the Democrat will align with the party most
sympathetic to black interests. When committee chairs and
assignments are doled out, or when a bill important to the party
leadership comes to a vote, he will support the Democratic position,
and the national Democratic Party is far closer to black voters' views
than their "local" white representatives are. 53  When it comes to
policy, rather than territorially allocated pork, the "real"
representatives of black southerners who live in majority-white
districts are Democrats from districts where a majority of the
electorate supports those policies-usually districts that are
themselves majority black or are northern and liberal.54 The reason to
vote for a southern white Democrat is to empower that coalition of
virtual representatives.
Consider black voters in Alabama. It was rational for them to
support Richard Shelby's campaigns for the Senate in 1986 and 1992,
not simply because he was the lesser of two evils-two respected
commentators have described his as "possibly the most conservative
record of any Democratic Senator" and this conservatism extended to
The central point here is that even if voting for the Democrat makes sense because he is the
lesser of the two politically viable evils with respect to his votes on particular policy issues,
black votes are really being cast defensively, rather than affirmatively.
53. Logrolling theory also helps to answer one criticism of race-conscious districting: that
it produces representatives who are outside the political mainstream of their own districts. See,
for example, Jim Wooten, Editorial, Racial Electoral Districts Create Division, Atlanta
Constitution G7 (Apr. 23, 1994) (claiming that Representatives Cynthia McKinney and John
Lewis, each of whom was elected from a majority-black congressional district, "are decidedly
more liberal than most Georgians, black or white" and that their districts lack "[t]he moderating
influences genuine diversity offers"). Some of the liberal positions black representatives take
may be the product of their vote trading with liberal representatives to obtain their support for
items of more importance to the black community. For example, a black representative from a
culturally conservative, religious community, might support funding for the National
Endowment for the Arts in return for receiving support from a culturally liberal congressman
on nutritional subsidies for poor rural school children. If the black representative's constituents
care more about the nutrition legislation than the arts funding, and the vote trading is integral
to passage of the nutrition bill, then the representative has in fact faithfully represented his
constituents' views over the legislative agenda as a whole even if he appears more liberal than
his constituents with respect to his vote on each issue taken separately.
54. For an historical example of this phenomenon, see Lani Guinier, The Tyranny of the
Majority 37 (Free Press, 1994) (noting that some blacks living in North Carolina during the
1940s, 1950s, and 1960s viewed Harlem congressman Adam Clayton Powell, rather than the
congressman from their district, as "their" representative).
For black southerners who live in Republican districts, substantive representation turns out
to have little to do with their relative presence in the electorate. "[A]cross all geographic re-
gions, the voting behavior of House Republicans turns out to be wholly unaffected by variations
in Black constituency size." Pildes, 108 Harv. L. Rev. at 1385 & n.116 (cited in note 8).
Furthermore, nearly three quarters of the black voters who were relocated into majority-black
districts in the South as part of the 1990 round of redistricting "were moved out of Republican
districts in which their presence appears to have had no effect on the voting patterns of their
representative." Id.
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racially salient issues55-but because his vote on structural issues of
party control was instrumental in placing moderate and liberal
Democrats such as Edward Kennedy, Howard Metzenbaum, and
Daniel Patrick Moynihan in charge of key committees and subcom-
mittees where those more sympathetic senators would exert strong
influence over the legislative agenda. Just because black support was
absolutely essential to his 1986 victory 6 does not mean blacks had
much "influence" over Shelby. To take the most glaring example,
their once indispensable support didn't prevent him from switching
parties in 1995. As a Republican, his legislative value to his black
constituents has essentially disappeared, even though his voting
record on most legislation, as opposed to issues of party loyalty, has
stayed relatively stable. As for the "swing' vote element of the
bleaching theory, blacks went from being an essential piece of a
winning coalition in 1986 to being entirely written off by 1995 even as
their overall share of the Alabama electorate had in fact increased.
The recent decision in Rural West Tennessee African-American
Affairs Council v. McWherter (Rural West I1)57 shows, albeit somewhat
unintentionally, how virtual, party-based representation is the key to
any realistic account of how bleaching works. Rural West 158 and
Rural West 1H involved a section 2 challenge to Tennessee's 1992 state
senatorial reapportionment. Initially, the district court held that the
plan violated section 2. Tennessee's voting-age population was 14.4%
black. The challenged plan, however, contained only three majority-
black districts out of thirty-three (9.1%).59 The plaintiffs showed how
two additional majority-black districts could be drawn: Shelby
County (Memphis) could be reconfigured to contain three 60% black
districts rather than the two overwhelmingly black ones created by
the existing plan. Another, 55% black district could be constructed by
linking black communities in six rural west Tennessee counties that
were split among several majority-white districts.
55. Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics, 1994 at 6
(National Journal, 1993). As a member of the House, Shelby had voted against extending the
Voting Rights Act and against the Martin Luther King holiday.
56. Id. at 10 (showing that Shelby received only 50% of the total votes cast; since black
voters voted overwhelmingly Democratic and constitute roughly 25% of the electorate, their
votes were clearly pivotal).
57. 877 F. Supp. 1096 (W.D. Tenn. 1995) (three-judge court), summarily affd, 116 S. Ct.
42 (1995).
58. Rural West Tennessee African-American Affairs Council v. McWherter, 836 F. Supp.
453 (W.D. Tenn. 1993) (Rural West 1) (three-judge court).
59. Rural West II, 877 F. Supp. at 1099.
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In Rural West I, the district court rejected the state's claim
that while the creation of these additional majority-black districts
would increase the number of districts blacks controlled outright,
such a change would reduce the overall clout of black voters in the
State Senate. It described that argument as inconsistent with section
2's focus on "visible black representation over other forms of political
influence."60 The court ordered the state to adopt a plan with at least
one more majority-black district. 61 But when given a second opportu-
nity, after the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. De Grandy,62
the court took a very different approach.
This time, the district court found that black voters had
achieved the kind of proportionate power that foreclosed a section 2
claim. In addition to the three districts which blacks controlled out-
right, the court held that the black community enjoyed legally signifi-
cant "influence" in any district where it formed more than 25% of the
voting-age population. 63 Under the court's definition, the challenged
plan contained three influence districts that were between 30 and 33
percent black, in addition to the three majority-black districts.64
"Together these six districts comprise 18.2% of all districts,"65 the
court observed, and therefore, under the totality of the circumstances,
the plan satisfied section 2.
60. Rural West I, 836 F. Supp. at 466.
61. The court noted that "[flour majority-black districts would be 12.1% of the Senate
districts, slightly below the voting-age population of 14.4%; five of thirty-three districts would be
15.2%, slightly above the black voting-age population." Id. at 463. It therefore concluded that:
[O]ne more majority-black Senate district must be drawn in west Tennessee. A second
majority black district would provide slightly more representation than the state's black
voting age population require. It would create five black Senate districts in the state or
more than 15% of the districts when the black voting age population is 14.4%. The issue
of creating a fifth black Senate district should be left to the political judgment of the
legislature. It is not required by federal law.
Id. at 467.
62. 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
63. Rural West II, 877 F. Supp. at 1101. The court explained:
We are confident that a minority population that votes as a bloc (as required by the sec-
ond Gingles precondition) and comprises at least 25% of the voting-age population in an
electoral district will have significant influence on candidates in virtually every election.
A serious candidate for office cannot ignore 25% of the population that tends to vote as a
bloc.
Id. at 1105.
For discussions of the concept of "influence districts" more generally, see, for example, J.
Morgan Kousser, Beyond Gingles: Influence Districts and the Pragmatic Tradition in Voting
Rights Law, 27 U.S.F. L. Rev. 551 (1993); Stanley Pierre-Louis, Comment, The Politics of
Influence: Recognizing Influence Dilution Claims under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 62 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1215 (1995).
64. Rural West II, 877 F. Supp. at 1106 n.8.
65. Id. at 1106.
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The evidence for Rural West Ii's new rule-that blacks enjoy
legally significant political influence in any district where they form
25% of the voting-age population-was so thin as to be almost nonex-
istent. In addition to a kind of casual statistical analysis that looked
solely at whether an abstract bloc of 25% of the electorate could be
decisive in determining the winning candidate66-which, for reasons I
have already explained, is a very different thing from determining
whether a racially defined minority bloc has influence-the court
relied heavily on two witnesses, both of whom were white state sena-
tors who represented districts with substantial black populations. Its
account of Stephen Cohen's testimony is an analytical gold mine.
Senator Cohen, whose district was 33% black, acknowledged that
without the support of black voters he would probably have lost the
1988 and 1992 elections.
The most probative aspect of Senator Cohen's testimony, however, concerned
the role that senators elected from influence districts play in the political dy-
namics of the Senate. Specifically Senator Cohen persuasively testified that
adding an additional majority-minority district in western Tennessee would
actually reduce the influence of black voters in the Tennessee Senate. He cited
as an example the legislative proposal to make the birthday of Martin Luther
King a state holiday, a bill which passed the Senate by only one vote (17 to 16).
Senator Cohen and another senator who represents a district with a substan-
tial black population in west Tennessee both voted for the bill. Senator Cohen
argued that by removing the black voters from the influence districts to create
a new majority-minority district, at least one more conservative white senator
would also be elected. This new conservative senator, elected from an over-
whelmingly white district, would be uninfluenced by black voters and would
have been inclined to vote against the Martin Luther King holiday, a measure
strongly favored by black voters but opposed by many white voters in west
Tennessee. As a consequence the measure would not have passed.
67
Leave aside the most obvious problem with this evidence: its
self-serving motivation. Legislators always claim to represent all
66. If the Rural West II courts theory were correct, one would expect that representatives
from districts whose voting-age populations were between 25% and 50% black would have
voting records that more closely resemble those of representatives from majority-black districts
than their counterparts from overwhelmingly white districts would have. But as Appendix 2
suggests, there is little discernable difference -between the voting records of southern
Democratic congressmen who represent influence districts and ones who represent
predominantly-white districts. Of the ten most "liberal" white representatives (leaving out one
white representative from a 65% nonwhite district), only two are from influence districts; the
other eleven white representatives from so-called influence districts all have higher CQ
conservative coalition scores than the most "conservative" representative from a majority-
nonwhite district.
67. Rural West II, 877 F. Supp. at 1105-06.
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their constituents, and legislators whose seats are in jeopardy are
likely to be particularly fervent in their protestations. The brooding
omnipresence of Rural West II is a fact that appears nowhere in the
published opinion: the partisan composition of the Tennessee Senate.
In February 1995, when Rural West 11 was announced, Democrats
enjoyed a one-vote edge.68 I suspect that the reason Speaker John
Wilder, whose district was 21% black, "used his authority to ensure
that black senators became chairmen of committees" 69 was because
those senators were Democrats and he was too, not because he was
responding directly to pressure from constituents. And votes on the
Martin Luther King Day bill split largely along party lines as well.
Unnoticed by the Rural West II court was a central fact about the
passage of the Martin Luther King Day bill: a majority of the
senators who voted in favor represented neither majority-black
districts nor "influence" districts. The presence of a substantial black
community within his district was by no means a necessary determi-
nant of a senator's support, although it might well have been suffi-
cient. Classical logrolling theory-not the concept of black
"influence"-is fully adequate to explain the outcome. Black legisla-
tors' position as a necessary element of the Democratic majority coali-
tion probably explains more of the affirmative votes than black voters'
presence within individual districts. Ironically, within a year after
Rural West II celebrated black influence within the Tennessee Senate,
one of its central preconditions disappeared. In September 1995, two
Democratic state senators defected to the Republican Party, and the
Republicans gained control of the state senate by a 17-16 margin.70
The fact that many white legislators with negligible numbers
of black constituents voted in favor of the King holiday, while legisla-
tors representing only the white community in Shelby County would
presumably have opposed it, 7' offers an illustration of a broader phe-
nomenon. A great deal of historical and contemporary evidence sug-
gests the presence of an influence "tipping point": blacks are more
likely to occupy a pivotal position when they are a relatively small
share of the electorate, because white voters are then less likely to
perceive them as a threat. As the possibility that blacks might be a
68. Ed Cromer, GOP Focuses on Capturing General Assembly; Senate Gains Energize
Party for Tough Work Ahead, Nashville Banner B2 (Sept. 19, 1995). The margin represented a
substantial erosion from 1992, when Democrats had enjoyed a twenty to thirteen lead.
69. Rural West II, 877 F. Supp. at 1105.
70. Cromer, Nashville Banner at B2 (cited in note 68).
71. See Rural West II, 877 F. Supp. at 1106 (recounting testimony that a "conservative
senator, elected from an overwhelmingly white district, would be uninfluenced by black voters
and would have been inclined to vote against' the holiday).
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dominant component of a biracial coalition grows, white backlash
increases as well.72 The backlash hypothesis suggests that the influ-
ence of black voters "is not a linear continuum along which respon-
siveness increases as the minority population percentage in a district
increases. 73 Instead, it seems as if influence might almost be curvi-
linear: black influence grows as blacks increase to roughly 30% of the
electorate; black voters face increasing resistance when they
constitute between 30% and 50% of the electorate; and beyond 50%,
the relationship between presence and influence is again positive
because, in William Keech's sardonic observation, "a Negro voting
majority can overcome a lot of white resistance."74
III. WHO'S LEFT?: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE EXODUS OF
WHITE DEMOCRATS
Any description of the political consequences of the Voting
Rights Act that looks solely at black voters will necessarily offer only
a partial account. The discussion in the previous section suggested
that the Democrats' declining electoral base is at least as much a
product of white voters individually deserting the party as it is of
black voters collectively being transferred to majority-nonwhite dis-
tricts. The great unasked question is what role, if any, the Voting
Rights Act has played in inducing white voters' defection.
72. See, for example, V.O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (Alfred A.
Knopf, 1949); Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics at 90-91 (cited in note 4); James E. Alt,
The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Black and White Voter Registration in the South, in
Chandler Davidson and Bernard Grofman, eds., Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of
the Voting Rights Act, 1965-1990 at 351, 359-60, 370-71 (Princeton U., 1994); Blacksher, 39
Howard L. J. at 674 n.194 (cited in note *).
This phenomenon explains much of the anecdotal evidence that commentators like
Thernstrom use to claim that white bloc voting is no longer an obstacle to black political aspira-
tions. Rigorous statistical analysis suggests the persistence of white bloc voting in most south-
ern jurisdictions with substantial black populations. See generally Handley and Grofman,
Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Minority Representation, in Davidson and Grofinan, eds.,
Quiet Revolution at 339 (cited in note 18). Many of the examples of successful black candidates
in Thernstrom's recent Emory Law Journal piece involve jurisdictions-like Maine, which is
less than 1% black, or Minneapolis, where blacks constitute 13% of the population, or black
Republican Representative J.C. Watts's 83% white Oklahoma district-where white resistance
to black candidates is likely to be dampened by the implausibility of fears of a black political
takeover.
73. McDonald, 65 Miss. L. J. at 308 (cited in note 35).
74. Id. at 309 (quoting William R. Keech, The Impact of Negro Voting: The Role of the Vote
in the Quest for Equality 101 (Rand McNally, 1968)). For a summary of recent studies that
support this classical observation, see Pildes, 108 Harv. L. Rev. at 1382 n.102 (cited in note 8).
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I think the Voting Rights Act is partially responsible for the
collapse of the New Deal coalition that kept congressional Democrats
in power. But the causal connection lies in the Act's central moral
commitment to full black enfranchisement rather than in its adoption
of the particular technique of race-conscious districting. It's a ques-
tion of rights, not remedies. When southern blacks regained the vote
as a result of the Voting Rights Act, they flocked to the Democratic
Party. The party became identified with their political program, and
this identification, along with their growing presence and influence
within the party, prompted "white flight."75 Put more starkly, recap-
turing the white southern element of the New Deal Democratic coali-
tion might be far more costly than eliminating a handful of majority-
black congressional districts; it might demand the party's visible
repudiation of its black supporters. My personal belief is that such an
abandonment would be immoral (as well as politically imprudent), but
I don't mean to debate that question here. Rather, my more limited
aim is simply to show that the stakes are higher than critics who
focus on districting as the devil seem to understand.
The idea that embracing civil rights might repel white south-
erners is hardly new. As an historical matter, the solid Democratic
South was itself built on opposition to black enfranchisement.76
Without the disenfranchisement of a large portion of the potential
opposition (blacks), Democrats could not have completely eliminated
party competition across the region. Democrats consolidated their
then-tenuous hold over southern politics by playing the race card.
Charges that Republicans, Populists, and other opposition parties
were in thrall to black votes played a significant role in attracting
white insurgents back to the Democratic Party. When, for the first
time, the Democratic Party adopted a pro-civil rights platform at its
1948 national convention, then-Democrat Strom Thurmond led a
walkout of southern delegates, ran for President on the Dixiecrat
ticket, and carried Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South
Carolina.77 After he signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, President
Lyndon Johnson remarked, "I think we just delivered the South to the
Republican party for a long time to come." 78
75. In a recent conversation, Rick Pildes suggested an additional link in this chain: the
emergence of identity politics that further alienated white members of the New Deal Democratic
coalition. I think he may well be right, although I wonder to what extent any effective black
politics is likely to be viewed in that light.
76. See, for example, Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics at 37 (cited in note 4)
(arguing that Democrats played on southern racism to maintain their control).
77. Edsall and Edsall, Chain Reaction at 34 (cited in note 35).
78. Joseph Califano, Tough Talk for Democrats, N.Y. Times Mag. 28 (Jan. 8, 1989).
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That deliverance was at least in part the product of sheer tem-
poral coincidence. The coalition that passed the 1964 Act was truly
bipartisan: congressional Republicans were more supportive than
congressional Democrats, largely because virtually all the
Republicans were from the North while many of the Democrats were
from the still virtually solid South . 9 But just as the Act was making
its way through the legislative process, "a conservative intraparty
insurrection, drawing most heavily on the South for the core of its
support" was "toppling... the pro-civil rights, eastern-establishment
wing of the Republican party."80 Barry Goldwater campaigned vigor-
ously on his opposition to the 1964 Act, and for the first time since
Reconstruction, a Republican presidential nominee carried the
Deepest South-Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South
Carolina.81 By contrast, Lyndon Johnson was firmly committed to,
and identified with, the Second Reconstruction. Thus the national
parties, which prior to 1964 were viewed as quite similar with regard
to civil rights,8 2 diverged sharply on the eve of the Voting Rights Act.8 3
From the point of view of opponents of civil rights, 1964 marked the
emergence of a choice, not an echo as between the two national par-
ties.
The reason President Johnson called the Voting Rights Act of
1965 one of the most monumental laws in the entire history of
79. See Edsall and Edsall, Chain Reaction at 61 (cited in note 35) (noting that 80% of
House Republicans but only 62% of Democrats voted in favor of the bill and 82% of Senate
Republicans but only 66% of Democrats voted for cloture, the essential step in getting the bill to
a vote).
80. Id. at 35.
81. Richard M. Scammon and Alice V. McGillivray, eds., America Votes 16 at 29 (Elections
Research Center, 1985). Goldwater's share of the votes cast in the two states that were mostly
the focus of voting rights agitation-87.1% in Mississippi and 69.5% in Alabama-suggests the
level of black disenfranchisement.
82. Edsall and Edsall, Chain Reaction at 35-36 (cited in note 35).
83. See C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow 129 (Oxford U., 3d rev. ed.
1974) (observing that "instead of dividing their votes between the two great parties... Negroes
have flocked fairly solidly to the Democratic standard and cast off their historic allegiance to the
Republican party"). There was perhaps a second temporal coincidence. The brutal treatment of
peaceful black demonstrators on the Edmund Pettus Bridge outside Selma galvanized the
nation in support of expansive federal protection of black voting rights. The Act was signed into
law on August 2, 1965, amid great optimism that guaranteeing blacks the right to participate in
the political process would solve the problems of the color line. Six days later, the Watts riots
erupted. Civil unrest, and fears of civil unrest, would replace the moral simplicity of the Civil
Rights Movement of the early 1960s with more intractable issues. That Vann Woodward,
Thomas Edsall, and the producers of the acclaimed PBS series Eyes on the Prize juxtapose these
events suggests their salience to observers with quite disparate perspectives. Compare
Woodward, Strange Career at 189 (cited in this note), with Edsall and Edsall, Chain Reaction at
48 (cited in note 35), and with Bridge to Freedom (episode 6 of Eyes on the Prize).
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American freedom was not simply because it was "the goddamnedest
toughest voting rights act" that his staff could devise.8 4 The Act's
ambition separated it from preceding civil rights laws: it sought to
transform black southerners into active participants in the govern-
ance process rather than simply recipients of congressionally con-
ferred fair treatment in some discrete arena.8 5 And it was precisely
this key moral ambition that implicates the Act directly in the decline
of the solid South.
The Act's immediate effect on black participation was electric:
by the end of 1967, more than 500,000 new black voters had been reg-
istered in the seven southern states subject to the Act's most strin-
gent provisions.8 6 Overall registration skyrocketed from roughly 29%
of the southern black voting-age population in 1965 to over 52% in
1967. 17 Southern resistance, particularly in jurisdictions with large
numbers of black voters and potential voters, was equally swift. For
example, the 1966 regular and special sessions of the Mississippi
Legislature passed a host of bills designed to ensure that even if
blacks managed to register and cast ballots, whites would remain in
control of the levers of power.88 That this resistance involved struggle
for control of the Democratic Party is symbolized by the fact that the
first reported post-Act racial vote dilution case, Smith v. Paris,89
involved a challenge to changes in the rules for selecting the
Democratic Executive Committee of Barbour County, Alabama. In
the face of an influx of newly enfranchised black voters, the party
switched to at-large elections to ensure that no black candidate could
win.
Black voters flocked to the Democratic Party at the very mo-
ment that the national Republican Party was launching what became
84. Howell Raines, My Soul Is Rested: Movement Days in the Deep South Remembered
337 (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1977) (interview with Nicholas Katzenbach, Attorney General during
the Johnson Administration).
85. See Karlan, 71 Tex. L. Rev. at 1719 (cited in note 9) (stating that the right to elect "is
what distinguishes self-governance, in which groups participate through their representatives
in the formation of policy, from civic republican charity, in which individuals depend on the
kindness of Platonic guardians").
86. Federal registrars, appointed under section 3 of the Act, registered almost as many
black voters in the South in five years as had been registered in the entire preceding century.
Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in Bernard Grofman and Chandler
Davidson, eds., Controversies in Minority Voting: The Voting Rights Act in Twenty-Five Year
Perspective 7, 21 (Brookings Institution, 1992).
87. Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley, and Richard G. Niemi, Minority Representation and
the Quest for Voting Equality 21-23 (Cambridge, 1992).
88. For an extensive account of this massive resistance, see Frank R. Parker, Black Votes
Count: Political Empowerment in Mississippi After 1965 at 37-66 (U. of North Carolina, 1990).
89. 257 F. Supp. 901 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
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known as the Southern Strategy-a calculated attempt to use race,
and racially coded issues, as the wedge to "break the economics class
base of the New Deal Coalition."90 The Voting Rights Act was one
such issue, and in 1969, when key temporary provisions of the Act
were up for review, the Nixon Administration publicly opposed them,
"demonstrat[ing] to the concerned electorate that a Democratic
Congress... was behind the singling out of the South as the target of
the most stringent enforcement provisions."91 Similarly, in 1981,
when the Act again came up for extension and amendment, the
Reagan Administration opposed efforts to continue preclearance or
substitute a results test for the difficult to satisfy "intent" require-
ment.92 Even if the conspiracy theorists are right in supposing that
Republicans have cynically used the Act to weaken white Democratic
districts, 93 the point still holds: the public posture of the presidential
wing of the Republican Party was one of resistance to the Act's solici-
tude for minority voters, and this public posture served to attract
white southern support.94
Most analyses of white voters' behavior, including the bleach-
ing critique, rest on a rational choice model that "assumes mutually
independent preferences of the various voters in a district."95 That is,
these analyses assume that white voters pick their substantive posi-
tions, party affiliation, and candidates without regard to the choices
being made by black voters. But as Rick Pildes pointed out, "a less
formal, more culturally specific model appears to capture more accu-
rately the dynamic relationship between race and politics, at least in
90. Edsall and Edsall, Chain Reaction at 40 (cited in note 35). As the Edsalls succinctly
phrase it, "the issue of race actually produced an ideological conversion of poor southern whites
from a deeply held economic liberalism to economic conservatism." Id. at 41.
91. Id. at83.
92. See, for example, Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count? at 116-17, 125, 127, 132-33 (cited
in note 20).
93. See note 35 and accompanying text.
94. See, for example, Michael Lind, The Next American Nation.. The New Nationalism
and the Fourth American Revolution 13-14 (Free Press, 1995) (suggesting that the Reagan and
Bush Administrations' embrace of "[t]okenism" in the redistricting arena not only undermined
Democratic congressional candidates but "provide[d] a suitably 'progressive' camouflage for a
system of divide-and-rule politics" in which the white elite "benefits from racial divisions among
the American majority").
A converse effect may operate on white Democrats. Laughlin McDonald suggests that
Georgia's white Democratic legislative bloc could have enacted a post-Miller congressional plan
that would have given it three new seats, as well as preserving the seats of the three black
Democratic incumbents, but that they declined to do so "because they thought the party would
damage itself among conservative whites by appearing to give in to black demands." McDonald,
65 Miss. L. J. at 295-96 n.113 (cited in note 35).
95. Pildes, 108 Harv. L. Rev. at 1382 (cited in note 8).
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the South. This alternative might be called the 'racial backlash' or
'racial tipping point' model."96 Under this model, whites tolerate black
presence within an institution until it reaches a critical mass, some-
where well short of a majority. Once critical mass is reached, "white
flight" begins. Tipping points are an example of catastrophe theory
since white individuals leave the community "at rate r up until some
percentage of minority population is reached, at which time the de-
parture rate increases dramatically."97
Most of the tipping point literature is concerned either with
residential neighborhoods or public schools. Pildes was concerned
with representatives' voting behavior and the influence-district ele-
ment of the bleaching hypothesis. 98 But perhaps the insights of tip-
ping point theory can be extended to deal with the question of party
affiliation. Perhaps the visible presence and concomitant influence of
black voters within the Democratic Party is itself a factor in white
voters' choice of political affiliation.
The conditions for tipping already exist: "In some of the deep
southern states ... blacks are steadily moving toward majority status
in Democratic primaries, and very few whites are prepared to be part
of a coalition in which they are a minority."99 That whites and blacks
have very different ideas of what an integrated community means is
suggested by surveys regarding residential neighborhoods. Blacks
tend to think of an integrated neighborhood as being from thirty to
sixty percent black. Among whites who express a commitment to
integration, the optimal racial composition is around twenty percent
black.100 That this general vision carries over into politics is sug-
gested by the Supreme Court's descriptions of the districts challenged
in the wrongful districting cases: the description of barely majority-
black districts as" 'segregated' suggests that only majority-white, and
96. Id. See also notes 72-74 and accompanying text (discussing other articulations of the
insight that the level of white resistance is positively correlated with black presence).
97. Frederick Schauer, A Comment on the Structure of Rights, 27 Ga. L. Rev. 415, 424
n.33 (1993).
98. Pildes's analysis tracks the discussion of curvilinear influence discussed in the text
accompanying notes 71-74. Pildes notes:
As the Black population reaches a critical mass, White voters begin to see Black partici-
pation as a credible threat; in reaction, White voters band together and develop more
conservative preferences. Given this backlash, increasing the number of liberal Black
voters in election districts will make those districts more conservative, until Black vot-
ers themselves become the majority.
Pildes, 108 Harv. L. Rev. at 1382 (cited in note 8).
99. Edsall and Edsall, Chain Reaction at 259-60 (cited in note 35).
100. See Michael H. Schill, Deconcentrating the Inner City Poor, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 795,
818 (1991); Reynolds Farley, Suzanne Bianchi, and Diane Colasanto, Barriers to the Racial
Integration of Neighborhoods: The Detroit Case, 441 Annals 97, 105 (1979).
[Vol. 50:291
BLEACHING AND TIPPING
therefore white-controlled, jurisdictions can be integrated." 10
Another version of this perspective is offered by the former state
chairman of the South Carolina Democratic Party:
For a long time now, Democrats generally in the South have been walking a
fairly narrow line between using black support as an advantage and letting
blacks take over and the Democratic Party becoming a black party. Blacks, if
they control the Democratic Party, will make it lose its viability.... Blacks
understandably are restless in the Democratic Party because they look at their
level of loyalty and say "Damn, if anybody deserves anything, we do." And in
normal political terms, that's true. But the other side of it is that if we gave
them everything they wanted, it would be a black party.
10 2
As we have seen, the solid South was already shaky by 1964 as a re-
sult of the realignment of the presidential wings of the two parties.
The Voting Rights Act's contribution was to introduce into the process
a sizable bloc of black voters, virtually all of whom entered the
Democratic Party. I do not want to oversimplify how this led to tip-
ping. The causes of white flight 1°3 from the Democratic Party are
undoubtedly complex. There are a number of ways in which blacks'
increased presence might encourage white flight. First, their appear-
ance within the Democratic Party made the party visibly "blacker."
This might have precipitated the departure of white voters who had a
strong taste for discrimination. Second, as some white voters left, and
as blacks became more politically active and adroit, they became in-
creasingly influential within the party. Some white voters might then
leave the party simply because they cannot accept black control. Yet
a third explanation might focus on the fact that an increasing black
presence within the party affected the party's stand on a variety of
substantive legislative issues. Perhaps this increased (or continued)
liberalism drove away some more conservative voters. 04 A fourth
might focus on black voters' insistence on descriptive representation,
101. Karlan, 1995 U. Chi. Legal Forum at 95 (cited in note 7).
102. Edsall and Edsall, Chain Reaction at 271 (cited in note 35) (interview with Donald
Fowler, former chairman of the South Carolina Democratic Party).
103. Perhaps it might also be characterized as white attraction to the Republican Party,
since a substantial part of the Republican Party's growth in the South is made up of transplants
from other parts of the country and younger voters who never were Southern Democrats.
104. See Daniel D. Polsby and Robert D. Popper, Jr., Racial Lines, Nat'l Rev. 53, 55 (Feb.
20, 1995) (arguing that "It]here is a secondary ripple effect [to race-conscious districting] that
may be even more important in the long run" since "racial gerrymandering inexorably pushes
the Democratic Party as a whole to the left' and "[t]he country grows more conservative even as




that is, the creation of majority-black districts that elected black
representatives. Viewed in this light, one problem with race-con-
scious districting is that when every majority-black district elects a
Democrat, it fans public perceptions of a black takeover.105 Finally,
white voters' perceptions of their own interests might be changed by
their view on racially salient issues. Politicians and commentators all
agree that the Democratic Party must rebuild its base among the
white middle-class and working-class voters who formed a key ele-
ment of the dominant New Deal coalition. The disagreements come
over the possibility and means of constructing a multiracial governing
coalition that fairly responds to the distinctive demands of its black
constituents. For the black community to exercise real political
power, blacks must be a key constituency within a party that controls
Congress, rather than an increasingly influential bloc within the
party out of power.
In some ways, we have been down this road before. One of the
tragedies of the last century was the answers we gave then to very
similar questions. America has had a few moments of opportunity
when economic distress and rising inequality have offered a possibil-
ity for economic-based coalitions that could transcend the normal
barriers of racial polarization. Reconstruction, the rise of the
Populists at the turn of the century, and the New Deal all offered a
chance for politicians to build cross-racial coalitions. 10 6 Unfortunately,
America has squandered many of those opportunities. At the height
of the Populist movement, one of its leaders, Tom Watson,
emphasized the difficulty in maintaining a working class alliance in
the face of partisan manipulation of the race card:
You might beseech a Southern white tenant to listen to you upon questions of
finance, taxation, and transportation; you might demonstrate with mathemati-
cal precision that herein lay his way out of poverty into comfort; you might
have him "almost persuaded" to the truth, but if the merchant who furnished
his farm supplies (at tremendous usury) or the town politician (who never
spoke to him excepting at election times) came along and cried "Negro rule!"
the entire fabric of reason and common sense which you had patiently con-
structed would fall, and the poor tenant would joyously hug the chains of an
actual wretchedness rather than do any experimenting on a question of mere
105. See Redistricting Increases Strength of Southern GOP, All Things Considered (Apr. 19,
1995) (Transcript # 1822-7) ("The Democratic Party in the Deep South is almost perfectly
divided between white and black politicians, and that is creating a picture in the minds of many
voters, I think, of a Democratic Party increasingly dominated by blacks. And in the long history
of Southern politics-I hate to say it-but thaCs always been a negative for white voters.")
(comments of Emory University political science professor Merle Black).
106. I owe this comparative historical insight to comments Willie Forbath made on an ear-
lier version of this paper.
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sentiment.... The Negro has been as valuable a portion of the stock in trade
of a Democrat as he was of a Republican. 0 7
The beginning of the New Deal offered another chance to build
a biracial coalition that was ultimately spurned. In a similar vein,
newfound liberal Michael Lind today argues that "[t]oday's
Republican strategy also resembles that of the old Southern
Bourbons, who for generations after the 1890s used racism and
cultural populism to prevent the formation of a biracial alliance
devoted to economic reform."108 In reviewing Lind's book, which calls
explicitly for outlawing the deliberate creation of majority-black
districts--"[a]ll racial preference programs should be consigned to the
junkyard of history," Lind says' 09-pragmatic liberal philosopher
Richard Rorty echoes Watson's bottom line:
Lind may well be right... that there is no hope of social and economic equality
unless the blue-collar "Reagan Democrats" can be convinced that the enemies
of the oligarchy are their friends. He may also be right that the abandonment
of racial preferences is the price that liberal politicians will have to pay to re-
gain the allegiance of those blue-collar voters. Most of that price will, as usual,
be paid by poor black people rather than politicians or intellectuals. But it
may have to be paid nonetheless. It will take a lot of class consciousness to de-
feat the oligarchy, and Lind makes a good case for saying that we will not get
sufficient class consciousness if we continue to insist on racial consciousness. 110
Of course no one within a mile of the political mainstream today ar-
gues that the solution is outright black disenfranchisement. In that
sense, the Voting Rights Act has been a smashing, and apparently
enduring, success. It has completely changed the terms on which the
right to vote as a right to formal participation is discussed. But we
ought to remember that it was precisely because blacks were viewed
as a possibly decisive swing bloc that might upset the existing politi-
cal order that resistance to full black political empowerment was so
107. Tom Watson, The Negro Question in the South, 6 Arena 541 (1892), quoted in C. Vann
Woodward, Tom Watson: Agrarian Rebel 222 (Oxford U., 1972). Perhaps in part as a conse-
quence of frustration over the Populists' defeats, Watson (and many other Populists) ultimately
succumbed to a particularly demagogic form of racism. Woodward, Strange Career of Jim Crow
at 80-81, 89-90 (cited in note 83).
108. Lind, The Next American Nation at 184 (cited in note 94).
109. Id. at 307.
110. Richard Rorty, Sins of the Overclass, Dissent 109, 110 (Spring 1996). For an example
of the strength of Lind's willingness to throw blacks overboard if they don't get with the pro-
gram, see Lind, The Next American Nation at 337-39 (cited in note 94). Thomas and Mary
Edsall adopt a complementary stance in Chain Reaction. Edsall and Edsall, Chain Reaction at
270-71 (cited in note 35).
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strong the last time around.", And we should remember that it was
not reactionaries alone who interred the First Reconstruction, leaving
us a century later with the festering remains of the racial divide it
sought to bridge. As Morgan Kousser concludes, disenfranchisement
was a typical product of Progressive ideas in its use of a good govern-
ment rationale to banish the messy realities of politics and to impose
a set of reforms that "disarmed radical critics while actually strength-
ening the status quo."" 2
So perhaps we should think longer and harder than many frus-
trated and disappointed liberals have so far about whether embracing
the universalist aspiration of a colorblind Constitution will be a step
forward, or a step back. After all, the very same paragraph of Justice
Harlan's Plessy dissent which articulated that vision began by declar-
ing:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it
is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power. So, I
doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great
heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty." 3
The lens of colorblindness loses a bit of its clarity when we see how its
very framer understood its compatibility with white educational,
economic, and political dominance. And rather than reviving the
failed notion that we can talk about American politics without taking
up questions of race, we need to face the question of how to integrate
the political process. Or else, when the future looks back at us, we
will appear small indeed.
IV. APPENDICES
Appendix 1 contains selected data about partisan politics in
eleven southern states. An asterisk next to a state's name iA the first
column means that the state created one or more new majority-non-
white congressional districts after the 1990 census.
"Control?" refers to control over the post-1990 reapportionment
process. Capital letters mean that a party controlled both houses of
the state legislature as well as the governorship.
111. See Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics at 35-38 (cited in note 4) (stating that
political parties played upon fears that "[i]f whites split... the Negroes would hold the balance
of power").
112. Id. at 260-61.
113. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Votes/seats ratios show the percentage of the state's overall
vote received by Republican candidates as opposed to Democratic
candidates and the percentage of the state's seats won by Republican
candidates compared to the percentage won by Democratic candi-
dates. The vote/seat ratios may not total 100% due to minor party
and independent candidates.
The 1994 Senate and Governor columns report both the results
of the 1994 elections (in caps; N/A means no election was held) and
the partisan breakdown following the election.
Sources: Election Data Services, 1994 Election Results Map (1994);
Center for Voting & Democracy, Dubious Democracy, 1994 Elections:
U.S. House of Representatives (1995).
Appendix 2 contains a chart and scattergram representing
voting behavior and district composition in the same eleven states.
The scattergram and chart contain information on the voting
behavior of white and black southern Democrats in the House of
Representatives for the 103d Congress, 1st Session. The chart does
not contain information on southern Hispanic representatives.
In the scattergram, series I (the diamonds) represents white
Democratic representatives. Series 2 (the squares) are black repre-
sentatives.
The horizontal axis reflects the percentage of each district's
voting-age population which is black or Hispanic. The vertical axis
reflects the Congressional Quarterly Conservative Coalition voting
scores with 100 being the most conservative and 0 being the most
liberal. These scores are calculated by looking at all votes on which
northern Democrats and Republicans disagree, and is a widely used
measure of conservatism/liberalism.
On the chart, the column labeled "CD" contains an identifier
for each congressional district in my sample. "HVAP" is the percent-
age of the district's voting-age population that is Hispanic; "BVAP" is
the percentage that is black; "MVAP" is the sum of HVAP and BVAP.
The voting score is in column "CQ CC".
In the top right hand corner is a chart showing the correlation
coefficients, r 2 values, and slope of the regression lines for white
representatives only, black representatives only, and the entire set of
representatives.
Source: Data contained in Higginbotham, Clarick, and David, 62
Fordham L. Rev. at 1653-67 (cited in note 52).
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APPENDIX 1
Selected Data About Partisan Politics in Eleven Southern States
State Control? 1992 votes vs. seats 1994 votes vs. seats 1994 Senate 1994
in % [R-D] in % [R-D] Governor
AL* divided V:40.1-55.9 V:56.2-43.8 N/A GOP
(GOP S:42.9-57.1 S:42.9-57.1 IR, ID (switch)
gov) 3R, 4D 3R, 4D
AR DEM V:40.2-59.1 V:52.6-47.4 N/A DEM
S:50.0-50.0 S:50.0-50.0 OR, 2D (retained)
2R, 2D 2R, 2D
FL* DEM V:51.1-46.0 V:51.4-48.6 GOP DEM
S:56.5-43.5 S:65.2-34.8 (retained) (retained)
13R, 10 D 15R, 8D IR, ID
GA* DEM V:45.1-54.9 V:54.6-45.4 N/A DEM
S:36.4-63.6 S:63.6-36.4 IR, ID (retained)
4R, 7D 7R, 4D
LA* DEM V:36.5-42.3 V:52.1-44.9 N/A N/A
S:42.9-57.1 S:42.9-57.1 OR, 2D dem
3R, 4D 3R, 4D
MS divided V:28.0-69.7 V:41.5-56.9 GOP N/A
(GOP S:0.00-100 S:20.0-80.0 (retained) gop
gov) OR, 5D IR, 4D 2R, OD
NC* DEM V:47.5-50.7 V:54.3-45.7 N/A N/A
S:33.3-66.7 S:66.7-33.3 2R, OD dem
4R, 8D 8R, 4D
SC* divided V:52.1-45.4 V:57.0-42.7 N/A GOP
(GOP S:50.0-50.0 S:66.7-33.3 IR, ID (retained)
gov) 3R, 3D 4R, 2D
TN DEM V:42.7-51.2 V:54.8-43.4 GOP GOP
S:33.3-66.7 S:55.6-44.4 (2 seats (switch)
3R, 6D 5R, 4D switched)
2R, OD
TX* DEM V:47.8-49.9 V:53.0-44.6 GOP GOP
S:30.0-70.0 S:36.7-63.3 (retained) (switch)
9R, 21D 1IR, 19D 2R, OD
VA* DEM V:48.3-48.5 V:54.0-42.2 DEM N/A
S:36.4-63.6 S:45.5-54.5 (retained) gop
4R, 7D 5R, 6D IR, ID
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CD BVAP _ i-AP MVAP CO CC_ __ CflRS Sop
AL3_ 23.6 -0.6 24.2 294 5
593 lk 0387 . .068955
AL1 0 14 9 A 0
59i --- T1O75A-6ARI 14.8 0.5 -- 163 5
AR2 152 0.7 15.9 86
FL11
FL2 21 2 23 73
FL5 4.1 2.6 7.3
F~~u 14.5137 22 4
15-- M2 04FLiS5 6. 3 .3 49
FL9 2.2 5 1
.4 1.4 198 89
GA9 35 1.6 5.1 80
GAIO- -16. k _ 1. 1 17.6 _ 75
LA3- - 19.5 - 2.4 2- 19 88
LA? __ 17. 1i.3 19 8i6
MS1 2 0.4 790 - 8i
MS Y 7.9§ 06.5 28.4 95MS4 36.5 0.4 36. $95
WS5 17.5 1.1 18.6 91
NC2 ___ 20.1 1. _Fl 1. 76
NC- 19.6 1.4 21 76
RaC4 18.9 .2 201 47
R,41NC7 -17.1 1.2~ 18.35 _
kNd8 _ 20.9 6 1 _21.9 67i
sc3 188 05 19.3 66,
SO _ 27. 9 0.5 _ 284 82!~
TN _ 3.5 -0.4 3.9 88
TN5 20.6 08 21.4 65
Th _ 5. _ 6 .5 5.9 701
TN8 -17.4 0.6 _ 18 i
ThI - 18.4 - 2.7 19.1 90
TX2 _ 15.4 _ 4.9 20.3 76i
TX4 7.7 3.6 11. 8
TX5 1653 15.3 3.6- 30
1x9 19.8 8. 28.-?P3 79
TXIO 10 18.7 28.7 63
xi .6 10. 25 86
TX12 7.4 13.8 21.2 95
txI3_- T5___ 7. _ 5. 23 9-5
TXI 10.4 20.4 30.8 93
TXd __3.6 68.4 70 60
Th17 3.2 1i4.1 17. 91§
1X24 1. 18.8 3670 7
TX25 24.6 .. 4.9 38 960
TX9 _ .8J - 55.4 5.2 - 40'7VA4 30.7 1 31.7 88
22.9 0.5 _ 23.4 82
VA 12. 8. 6_20.5 36.
VA9 2.4 0.5 i29 52'
VAl 7j.5 7 _145 3
FL3 506 -_2.7 53.3 - 39
FL17 54 2. _78.1 _ 43*
FL23 45.7 9. 5.8 18
GA2 _ 2.3 _ .6 5.9 59
GAS 575 1.8 59.5 9
GAll__ 60.4 1 61.4 7
wLA2 58.2 8 60 23
LA4 b__ 2.6 0. 63.5 20
MS2 __ _58.1 _0.51 58.6 14
NCI 53.4 -0.7 5 4. 1 14.
N C 1 5 _ 
3 3 
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